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THE STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 880370-CA

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Classification Priority No. 2

CHARLES LANGDON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review
this matter by virtue of 78-2a-3

(2) (e) , Utah Code Annotated,

1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This

is

an

appeal

from

the

Judgment,

Sentence

and

Committment of the Fifth District Court of Iron County, State of
Utah, The Honorable J. Philip Eves, presiding.

The conviction is

for

of

a

second

substance with

degree

felony

intent

to

of

possession

distribute

a

controlled

for value, the

substance

being cocaine.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Did
Motion

to

the trial

Suppress

court

evidence

improperly
in

the

deny

matter

the

Defendant's

where

officers

conducted a warrantless search of the Defendants vehicle?
Did the officers have sufficient cause to conduct a
warrantless

search

of

the

vehicle

under

the

following Chambers v. Maronev, 399 U.S. 42 (1970)?

line

of

cases

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
77-7-15,

UTAH

CODE

ANNOTATED,

1953,

AS

AMENDED.

AUTHORITY OF A PEACE OFFICER TO STOP AND QUESTION SUSPECT.
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or
is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public
offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of
his actions.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This

is

an

appeal

from

the

Judgment,

Sentence

and

Committment ordered from the Bench on June 1, 1988, and signed by
the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Fifth District Judge, and
thereafter.

The

Defendant

had

entered

a plea

of

no

filed

contest

following a hearing by the Court on a Motion to Suppress Evidence
heard on May 17, 1988.

The Court denied the Motion to Suppress

Evidence, and thereafter, the Defendant entered his plea of no
contest.

The

Defendant

is

presently

serving

a

term

of

imprisonment in the Utah State Prison of not less than 1 year and
no more than 15 years.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On

March

17,

1988, the

Defendant

was

arrested

and

charge with possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute for value, the substance being cocaine.

On May 17,

1988, a Motion to Suppress was heard by the District Court and
was denied.

On June 1, 1988, the Defendant entered a plea of no

contest to the Information and was forthwith sentenced to the
2

Utah State Prison,
and

It is the Judgment, Sentence and Committment

the memorandum

decision

and

Order

denying

Suppress the Evidence which are the subject

the

Motion

to

for this appeal*

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
After the denial of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress
Evidence, the Defendant entered a plea of no contest and was
thereafter sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a period of not
less than 1 nor more than 15 years,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On Thursday, March 17, 1988, the Defendant was driving
a 1978 Cadillac from Los Angeles, California, to Omaha, Nebraska,
along the Interstate 15 freeway in Iron County
2,

1988, P. 18),

At approximately

6:30

(Transcript, May

p.m., the

Defendant's

vehicle was observed by Trooper Russell Lee of the Utah Highway
Patrol

to

be

traveling,

apparently

with

another

vehicle,

northbound on the Interstate freeway at the approximate rate of
70 miles per hour (T. 30).

Trooper Lee stopped the Defendant's

vehicle but did not stop the other vehicle.

Trooper Lee then

wrote the Defendant a warning citation for speed and checked his
driver's

license

and

registration

(T. 30).

Trooper

that the Defendant was not the registered owner.

Lee

found

The Defendant

informed Trooper Lee that the vehicle was registered in the name
of Marvin or Anthony Linnear, one of whom was a stepson (T. 29).
Langdon informed Trooper Lee that the car was registered in the
Linnears' names for insurance purposes, and that Langdon had been
purchasing the car from them for approximately one and one-half
3

years (T. 29)•

Langdon gave Trooper Lee a telephone number which

could be called in order to confirm the Defendant's authority to
be

in

possession

dispatcher,

at

of

the

Trooper

car

Lee's

(T. 31) •
request,

The

Highway

attempted

to

Patrol

call

registered owners at the California phone number (T. 18)•
the

dispatcher

was

attempting

to call

the

registered

the

While

owners,

Trooper Lee asked the Defendant if he could search the car for
weapons or contraband.
ahead

The Defendant replied, "I don't care.

Go

(T. 14)". The Trooper searched both the interior and the

exterior of the car carefully and found welded to the frame of
the car below the trunk and between the rear bumper and the gas
tank,

a black

metal

box which

appeared

to be

constructed

of

channel iron measuring approximately 4" x 5" x 12" (T. 2 3 & 33).
The box was locked with an apparently new padlock (T. 24) .

The

Trooper stated at the Motion to Suppress Hearing that there were
no signs of dirt or grime or road debris on the box or the lock.
Trooper Lee was notified by the Highway Patrol dispatcher that
she had been called by a person purporting to be Anthony Linnear,
who confirmed that the Defendant had a right to be in possession
of the vehicle

(T. 31) .

Both the Defendant and Anthony Linnear

denied knowledge of the box and refused to give consent for the
search of the box

(T. 38) .

The Trooper testified that on the

basis of the information available to him, he felt the vehicle
was suspicious (T. 25). Justice of the Peace Margaret Miller was
contacted and an audio-taped proceeding was had wherein Trooper
Roger Bagley, who had been at the scene with Trooper Lee, was
4

questioned by Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney Keith F. Oehler
(T. 5). At the conclusion of Trooper Bagley's testimony, Judge
Miller found that there was sufficient evidence to support a
search warrant

(T. 11) .

However, no search warrant was ever

executed and the vehicle was searched without a warrant (T. 12).
Approximately

seven

ounces

of

cocaine,

roughly

90

percent pure, was recovered from the locked box.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Evidence seized from the Defendant's vehicle was

seized without a search warrant.
2.

The Defendant and his vehicle were unreasonably

detained in order to accomplish the seizure of the evidence.
3.

There were

insufficient

facts available to the

officer to justify the intrusion into the Defendant's vehicle and
the locked compartment under the vehicle.
ARGUMENT
I
THE EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS
SEIZED PURSUANT TO A WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN
SUPPRESSED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
The trial court determined that the seizure of the
evidence from the locked compartment underneath the Defendant's
vehicle was warrantless

after having

found

that the Trooper

appearing before Justice of the Peace Miller had properly made
out and Affidavit but that Justice of the Peace Miller had never
signed a document purporting to be a search warrant
5

(T. 12) .

Because the court determined that the search was warrantless, the
next determination was to find whether or not there was a valid
search as contemplated in United States v. Leon, 4 68 U.S. 897
(1984) .

The Leon rationale has been adopted with favor by this

court in the case of State v. Thompson, 77 Utah Adv. Rep. 34
(Utah Ct. App. , March 9, 1988).

However, both Leon and State

v. Thompson can be distinguished from the existing case because
the officers in both cases had in their possession documents
supporting

the

"objectively

reasonable

reliance

on

prior,

external authorization" which are not present in this case.

The

officers in this case acted without any documentation at all and
therefore

it is difficult to see how a claim of reasonable

reliance on external authorization can be made.
II
THE DEFENDANT WAS HELD FOR AN UNREASONABLE PERIOD OF
TIME PRIOR TO THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE.
It should also be argued that the Defendant was seized
for an unreasonably

long period of time.

The Defendant was

originally stopped and issued a traffic warning for speeding.
The officer testified at the motion to suppress hearing that the
time need for such a process was 5 to 10 minutes.

However, the

Defendant was stopped for a total of 2 hours and 10 minutes
before
seized.

the

locked

compartment

was

opened

and

the

evidence

In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), a 90

minute detention was held to be unreasonably
minute detention was found to be too long
6

lengthy.

A 20

in United States

v, Gonzales, 763 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1985).
Supreme

Court has

said

in the case of

The United States

Florida v. Rover, 4 60

U.S. 491 (1983):
An investigative detention must be temporary and
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purposes of the stop.
Similarly, the investigative
methods should be the least intrusive means reasonably
available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion
in a short period of time.
In

the

present

case,

the

officer's

concern

about

whether or not the vehicle was stolen was dispelled by 7:15 p.m.
The officer had no further legal cause to hold the vehicle after
that time, and Mr. Langdon should have been released.
Ill
THERE WERE INSUFFICIENT FACTS UPON WHICH THE OFFICER
COULD CONCLUDE THAT THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE CONTAINED CONTRABAND,
AND THEREFORE THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE
WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The leading case in this field is Chambers v. Maroney,
399

U.S. 42

(1970)

in

which

police

officers

were

given

a

description of a car involved in a robbery following a second
armed robbery within a one-week period.

The police were also

given a description of the clothing worn by two of the four men
seen in the car.

Within an hour after receiving the description,

the police stopped a car meeting the description, carrying four
men, two of whom were wearing the described clothing.
men

were

station.

arrested

and

the

vehicle

was

taken

to

The four

the

police

The police conducted a warrantless search of the car

and found two revolvers and property stolen in the robberies.
7

The U.S. Supreme Court in Chambers v. Maroney, supra., recognized
the

long-standing

between

an

distinction

automobile

and

for search and
a

home

or

seizure

office.

purposes

The

court

acknowledged that there are cases in which circumstances would
justify the search of an automobile without a warrant which might
not justify the search of a home or office without a warrant.
However,

the

U.S. Supreme

Court

in Chambers

and

in

following

cases has continually asserted the foundational requirement that
there must be probable cause to believe that the car contains
articles that the officers are entitled to seize.
It is because of the lack of probable cause in this
case that the evidence should be suppressed.
case apparently
Defendant's

The trooper in this

is claiming that the observable

vehicle

and the characteristics

fcicts in the

of the

Defendant,

coupled with the location of the vehicle on the Interstate 15
freeway, support the concept that the Defendant was meeting some
sort of drug courier profile.

In the case of Reid v. Georgia,

448 U.S. 438 (1980), the United State Supreme Court held that a
federal DEA agent, as a matter of law, could not have reasonably
suspected
having

the

arrived

Defendant

of criminal

in Atlanta

morning, apparently

activity

on the basis of

from Fort Lauderdale, in the

concealing the fact that he was

early

traveling

with a companion, and carrying no luggage other than a shoulder
bag.

In

suspect

the

instant

Mr. Langdon

case, the
of

carrying

trooper

could

cocaine.

not

There

reasonably
is

nothing

unusual about a vehicle being on Interstate 15, and the fact that
8

the vehicle has a new paint job and new expensive tires does not
support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
worth

of

fast

food

reasonable

inference

California

and

restaurants.

wrappers

One day's

in the

car

only

that Mr. Langdon

had

been driving

eating his meals along the road

supports

the
from

at drive-in

The trooper had direct information from a person

purporting to be the owner of the car that Mr. Langdon had
permission to have the car.

The claim that there were few

personal items in the car is specious when two pieces of luggage
were found in the trunk, and a pillow and blanket or sleeping
bag were located in the back seat.
the Defendant was unreasonably

In this circumstance where

detained

for

2 hours and 10

minutes while the State attempted to get a search warrant which
was never issued, there is not the type of probable cause present
to even support such a search warrant.

It is not unreasonable to

believe that on any given day dozens of vehicles travel on
Interstate 15 in Iron County which have locked compartments and
all

of

the

other

Mr. Langdon's vehicle.

characteristics

which

were

present

in

The writer of this Brief is familiar with

several family vehicles which travel on Interstate 15 and other
highways within the State of Utah which have specially welded
locked compartments affixed to the vehicle.
compartments contain
known

to

this

The fact that these

fishing poles rather than contraband

writer,

but

the

appearance

of

the

is

locked

compartments on the vehicle is not sufficient justification for a
warrantless search of the vehicle and a 2 hour detention of the
9

driver.

None of the factors supporting probable cause for a

warrantless search as outlined in Chambers v. Maroneyr Supra., or
in a later case of Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67

(1975), are

present in this case.
CONCLUSION
As the officers searched this vehicle without a valid
search

warrant,

and

because

of

the

lack

of

other

factors

supporting probable cause for a warrantless search, cind the lack
of good faith exceptions in this case, the evidence in this case
should be suppressed

and the Defendant should be allowed to

withdraw his no contest plea and be discharged.
DATED this

y

day of September, 1988.
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